SUBSCRIBER+EXCLUSIVE EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — More than two years after its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the U.S. still does not have a clear way forward in the country, which means that two decades of investment and sacrifice by the U.S. and its allies - and two decades of gains for Afghans - seems to have disappeared almost as if we’d never been there.
Today, Afghans continue to suffer under a brutal regime. Millions of Afghans have been displaced, women and girls have no access to education, the country is facing humanitarian and economic crises, and instability and the potential for terrorism create legitimate concerns across the region as well as in Europe and the United States.
Even with these concerns, there has been little progress by the U.S., UN, and the international community to improve conditions in Afghanistan as Taliban Emir Haibatallah seems uninterested in real dialogue with the West or in making changes to the harsh policies that could result in gradual progress toward some level of normalization.
It’s almost as if Haibatallah is intentionally taking steps to keep the international community at bay. This is despite the somewhat more moderate views expressed by some of his senior leaders toward cooperation with the West and a greater willingness by those same leaders to take a more moderate position on issues important to the international community, such as the rights of women and girls.
The recent attack by ISIS-K in Russia is a reminder that instability in Afghanistan threatens not only the region but also U.S. interests abroad and possibly at home. Further, the UN recently raised concerns about the state of the terrorist safe haven in Afghanistan that could allow al-Qa’ida to resurge.
The U.S. Intelligence Community may have a different assessment of the status of al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan and the effectiveness of actions taken by the Taliban to control al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan, but it seems clear that the country continues to provide safe haven and raw materials that allow terrorist attacks, terrorist recruitment, and extremist ideology to spread from Afghanistan across the region and beyond. Today, as a government, the Taliban is failing, and Afghanistan is a failed state with no real pathway forward.
The United States does not consider the Taliban to be the legitimate government of Afghanistan but recognizes that practical engagement with the Taliban is important given these concerns. But an effective strategy to deal with the Taliban has been elusive since the U.S. withdrawal. The U.S. and the international community did not want a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, considering the enormous investment over two decades of supporting the Afghan Government, and they were unprepared to deal with the outcome.
After dealing in Doha with Taliban interlocutors who appeared more moderate, the U.S. and the international community were certainly not prepared for the harsh and uncompromising leadership of Haibatullah, who quickly began to roll back the basic rights and freedoms of Afghans, especially for women and girls, and walk back previous commitments.
Despite diligent efforts by the U.S. Department of State, USAID, and the UN to engage with the Taliban on issues important to Afghanistan and the international community, the Taliban continues to frustrate those efforts.
As just one example, the Taliban refused to attend a UN-sponsored conference on Afghanistan in Doha in February of this year unless its demand to act as Afghanistan’s sole official representative was met. The UN rightly refused as that would have been de facto recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate government in Afghanistan. That refusal was another reminder that the Taliban believes it has the upper hand and that it can dictate terms. It also reflects the limited leverage our diplomats and international partners now have in engaging with the Taliban.
Afghan voices opposed to the Taliban are geographically and philosophically dispersed to the point that they are almost silent from a unified approach standpoint, despite their best efforts. Many of these Afghans are struggling with resettlement, financial support, and ensuring a future for their children following the fall of Afghanistan.
A number of Afghan groups have tried and failed to garner support and unite Afghans behind a shared vision for the future. A lack of actionable engagement by the U.S., UN, and the international community with these displaced influential Afghans only reinforces their current lack of influence.
Although the armed opposition to the Taliban, represented primarily by the National Resistance Front and Afghan Freedom Front, has proved somewhat resilient, it does not have the support and resources to mount an effective challenge to the Taliban. In other words, legitimate Afghan opposition to the Taliban, inside and outside the country, is fractured, dispersed, and lacks support.
A Way Forward
A way forward is complicated by a general lack of agreement in Washington on what priority to place on the U.S. role in Afghanistan’s future. Washington is a crowded space for national priorities, and other important things are going on – great power competition, Ukraine-Russia, Israel-Hamas, Israel-Iran, China-Taiwan, nefarious actions by Iran and its surrogates, tension across the Middle East, North Korea saber rattling, and an upcoming presidential election. Afghanistan also remains a divisive issue for many and is easily politicized. The result is the lack of a clear political way forward to address issues in Afghanistan.
There are no simple solutions here, but options seem clear.
First, the U.S. and the international community can simply accept that the Taliban is in power and give in to its demands that we accept it as it is and stay out of internal issues in Afghanistan. That is the Taliban position, and some countries may see this as a practical way forward. The U.S. does not view the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, so the U.S. does not see this as an acceptable option.
Second, the U.S. and the international community can continue with the current transactional engagement with the Taliban. Today, the U.S. engages the Taliban with limited leverage on single issues, such as counterterrorism, the rights of women and girls, the release of Americans in Taliban custody, and the effective distribution of humanitarian aid. In some cases, those engagements have resulted in modest progress, usually when they serve the direct interests of the Taliban, as in the case of ISIS-K. This approach is ultimately based on the hope that continued engagement will change Taliban conduct and behavior over time. Despite those engagements over the past two-plus years, Taliban conduct and behavior appear firmly entrenched, and Afghanistan remains a failed state today.
Finally, the U.S. and international community can move to a plan of action in Afghanistan based on three points: (1) the current trajectory of Afghanistan is unacceptable and poses significant risk to Afghans, the region, and the international community, (2) the Taliban is not the legitimate government of Afghanistan and does not represent all Afghans, and (3) real progress in Afghanistan requires a change to a more inclusive government that is representative of the rights and freedoms of all Afghans equally and more cooperative with the U.S., the UN, and the international community.
There are steps we can take to begin to move in a new direction.
First, let’s take the important step of recognizing and enabling legitimate political opposition to the Taliban. We should be clear that the Taliban does not speak for all Afghans inside the country, and it certainly does not speak for the tens of thousands of the best and brightest Afghans who now live in exile around the world.
Talking to the Taliban about the future of Afghanistan is ultimately a conversation about the legitimacy and survival of the Taliban regime. We need more representative Afghan voices. We need influential Afghans who can speak for and represent all Afghans everywhere, who can engage directly with the U.S. (State Department, USAID, Congress, Non-Profit Organizations), the UN, and the international community, and who can negotiate with the Taliban on behalf of all Afghans on much-needed changes at home.
We already know them.
There are thousands of former Afghan government officials, intelligence and security leaders, tribal elders, and leaders from the private sector, civil society, academia, humanitarian organizations, and women’s rights groups available to support this effort. The U.S. and the international community have worked with and trusted these individuals and groups for years to achieve common goals in Afghanistan and in the region; in many cases working side by side for two decades. They represent hope for the future.
These Afghans represent the legitimate political opposition to the Taliban given the nature of the collapse of the government. They represent the vast diversity of Afghans everywhere and have the expertise and willingness to move Afghanistan in a better direction. But, if the political opposition is to be relevant and influential, it has to be more than simply aspirational; it needs real recognition and support. With recognition and support by the U.S., the UN, and the international community, this group can become an important partner and leader in working to transition Afghanistan to a more sustainable future.
Of course, there are challenges.
We can enable the legitimate political opposition to the Taliban, but we can’t determine its makeup. This approach requires that Afghans organize and unite so that a small group of Afghans seen as legitimate across the international community and within Afghanistan, can unite with, speak for, and represent Afghans everywhere, and represent the numerous Afghan groups that exist around the world.
This certainly involves challenges given the country’s turbulent history but Afghans should recognize that the Taliban becomes more entrenched every day and there may be limited opportunities in the future to influence real change. Past grievances, political differences, and personal ambitions should be put aside. Reconciliation, trust, and unity are now essential. This is an opportunity for new Afghan leaders to emerge who can represent Afghans on the global stage. For some former Afghan leaders, perhaps their time has come and gone; for some new leaders, their time is now. Afghans should look forward, not backward, in choosing who will represent its interests and who can shape their future.
Second, let’s make it a stated U.S. policy objective that the government in Afghanistan evolves to a power-sharing government envisioned by the Intra-Afghan dialogue in 2020/2021. These talks were enabled and supported by the U.S. and the international community as a means for a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Afghanistan. Because these talks were never completed, the U.S. could consider this unfinished business from a policy perspective.
The state of Afghanistan today suggests that our current approach will not secure our long-term national security interests or provide for a secure and peaceful Afghanistan that does not pose a threat beyond its borders. If we are to see real change in Afghanistan, it requires an evolution, a change, in the Taliban government consistent with the goals of the Intra-Afghan Dialogue; a dialogue that was undermined by the Taliban and the collapse of the Afghan Government.
Such an approach does come with risks. The Taliban will resist this policy and may cease some engagement with the U.S. The Taliban could also say this policy threatens cooperation on ISIS-K or other issues important to the U.S. so there could be setbacks in our current negotiations.
U.S. engagement with the Taliban is important and should continue, but do we see this approach as a long-term solution? Do we believe the current U.S. policy will secure the limited gains we’ve achieved over the long term and move Afghanistan forward or will those gains deteriorate? Further, do we want Taliban resistance to this approach to determine U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, or do we want a plan that meets our long-term national security interests and those of our international partners?
Third, in coordination with the legitimate opposition to the Taliban, let’s support this policy objective by coordinating a unified international approach of willing nations to the Taliban and Afghanistan. I say “willing nations” to note that some countries have already started to normalize relations with the Taliban and are unlikely to support this.
Many countries have stated publicly that the Taliban must have a more inclusive government but there is no coordinated international approach to move toward that outcome. An agreement by willing countries, led by the U.S., to require the Taliban to evolve to a power-sharing government and take other identified critical steps as part of any normalization process could be persuasive. It’s possible that the same coalition of countries that committed funding, soldiers, and diplomats to Afghanistan for 20 years can unite on an action plan for the future of Afghanistan.
The unified message to the Taliban should be that the only path to international recognition runs through a dialogue toward the power-sharing government that the U.S. and the international community pursued in 2021.
Of course, Haibatallah will reject this forcefully based on the Taliban belief that it defeated the U.S. coalition, and former Afghan government and does not need to compromise. The Taliban will continue its long-standing approach to divide and conquer and try to make deals directly with individual countries.
The Taliban is also likely to reach out directly to former Afghan leaders and groups to undermine unity. Cohesion and resolve of the international community will certainly be tested. Without this coordinated approach, more countries will slowly move toward normalization with the Taliban either as a matter of necessity, possibly out of security or economic concerns, or to use the appeal of normalization to gain access to Afghanistan’s natural resources or to advance their national security interest at the expense of the U.S. or countries in the region.
This has to be a coordinated international effort, led by the U.S. and in coordination with the UN, or it will fail. At the same time, this international pressure may also create important and difficult leadership conversations within the Taliban on leadership, its priorities, and engagement with the West. A united international front on engagement with the Taliban could inform those conversations.
Finally, let’s work very closely with Afghanistan’s neighbors in the region, with a priority on Central Asia, on border security concerns and the spread of terrorism, terrorist recruiters, and extremist ideology from Afghanistan across regional borders.
This requires information sharing on ISIS-K, al-Qa’ida, and other regional terrorist groups that are a high priority for these countries; the provision of appropriate technology that enables collaboration; and sustained intelligence, security, and analytic exchanges. Our partners closest to Afghanistan have the most to lose, but much to contribute toward support for a way forward in Afghanistan, and our sustained engagement will make a difference.
We also have to engage with Pakistan. It is difficult to fully address the U.S. relationship with Pakistan and the complex evolution of the Pakistan-Taliban relationship. The U.S. and Pakistan disagree on a number of issues, but there is a common interest in counterterrorism, regional stability, and economic development across the region. Pakistan must review its approach to Afghanistan and place better controls over the Madrassas that enable extremism and violence that contributes to instability in Afghanistan and the region. Pakistan has a role to play if there is going to be stability in Afghanistan.
It is certainly reasonable to be skeptical given our past experiences in Afghanistan. Some may say this approach is naïve given the challenges of engaging with the Taliban, the likely difficulties of uniting the legitimate political opposition, and the state of Afghanistan today.
Frankly, that’s a fair response. This is a difficult challenge with few good options. Like many who may be reading this, I have worked in Afghanistan long enough to know that many good ideas go to Afghanistan to fail, that some Afghan groups find more reasons to fight and disagree than to agree, and that the international community, despite expressions of support, can be fickle on cooperating on something as challenging as Afghanistan is today.
Of course, some of Afghanistan’s neighbors—think Russia, China, and Iran—will certainly continue to actively undermine any efforts by the U.S. in the region. The Great Game started here in the 19th century, and 21st-century Great Power Competition continues to play out here today. To put it simply, this will be exceptionally difficult and will take time, resources, and consistency of commitment to be successful. We should not avoid this approach simply because it is difficult. Most consequential policy issues are difficult, but we pursue them because they contribute to our long-term national security interests and those of our partners in the region. Our options later may be far more difficult.
Without a change of course, our default position is to continue with uncoordinated transactional engagement with the Taliban whereby each country, including the U.S., tries to make the best deal it can. We know from the U.S. experience in Doha that the Taliban are resilient and hardened negotiators. The Taliban will agree to meetings, send officials who cannot make decisions, and agree to nothing in the process. From those experiences, the Taliban believes it can simply outlast the U.S., UN, and international community and that countries will eventually give in and agree to some level of normalization on Taliban terms.
Without action, this will become a reality; some countries are moving in this direction already. This is certainly no criticism of our diplomats. I have seen the challenges they face and the extraordinary efforts they’ve made to find a way forward in Afghanistan. The question for the U.S. is if we believe our current efforts will enhance stability in Afghanistan, help contain the threat of terrorism, and support our national security interests and the long-term national security interests of our partners in the region or do we require a different approach?
Beyond these issues, our reputation, influence, and relevance in the region are also important. Many of the countries in the region are certainly disappointed with the U.S. withdrawal and its impact on the region. Still, those same countries believe that the U.S. has the influence and means to ensure matters do not get worse in Afghanistan, that we can bring together willing nations, and that we can find a way forward.
I agree with them.
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